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Comment/ Subcontracting and Employment Security-
In the Light of Fibre board-Fibre board Paper Products v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964)
IN ITS RECENT DECISION in Fibreboard Paper Products v. N.L.R.B.1 the Su-
preme Court has once again raised the dander of the businessman's labor rela-
tions analyst, has befuddled union counsel as to when redress will be avail-
able, and has failed to clarify the current issues in -industrial negotiations
relating to "subcontracting" 2
The Court ruled that an employer, even though acting for purely eco-
nomic motives, is obligated to bargain collectively in good faith with the
union representing maintenance employees over a decision to subcontract
out that work formerly performed by the employees in the existing bargain-
ing unit. This landmark decision was a mixture of broad principles with
narrow application to the facts of the particular case, resulting in a lack of
guidance for the N. L. R. B., the Courts and representatives of both labor
and management.
It is the object of this comment to analyze the Fibreboard opinions of the
Board, the Court of Appeals and the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court
in light of past Supreme Court cases, the high court's disposition of
the Adams Dairy case and the Board's modification of its subcontracting
standard.3
1 Fibreboard Paper Products Co. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
See generally, address by Francis A. O'Connell to the Industrial Relations Society of
New York, "The Inflexible Duty to Bargain," January 21, 1965, 58 LRR 51. See also panel
discussion on "Collective Bargaining: New Bench Marks and Their Implications," American
Management Association's Personnel Conference, Chicago, Ill., 58 LRR 148.
' Although the Supreme Court addressed itself to the issue of the Board's statutory au-
thority to remedy a violation of Section 8 (a) (5) by ordering resumption of the subcontracted
operations and the reinstatement with back pay of the former employees.
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I. FIBREBOARD BEFORE THE BOARD AND COURTS
A.Statement of the Case
Local 13044 was the exclusive bargaining agent of the maintenance employees
at the Emeryville, California, plant of Fibreboard Paper Products Corpora-
tion.5 The unit of employees represented by Local 1304, numbering about
fifty,6 was composed of maintenance mechanics, electricians, firemen and en-
gineers employed in the power house. The collective bargaining agreement
in existence was due to expire on July 31, 1959.7
In accordance with the terms of the contract, the union notified Fibre-
board on May 26, 1959, more than sixty days prior to the expiration of the
agreement, of its desire to negotiate a modification of the current agreement.
Despite this timely notification, primarily as a consequence of the stalling
tactics of the company, no actual bargaining transpired until July 27, 1959,
four days before the expiration date of the agreement.8
At the July 27 meeting, the company informed the union that negotia-
tions would be of no value since the decision to contract out the maintenance
operation, thereby displacing all the employees represented by the Steel-
workers, had already unilaterally and irrevocably been made.9 A final meet-
'East Bay Union Machinists Local 1304, United Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO.
(Hereinafter referred to as "steelworkers" or "union").
5 Hereinafter referred to as "Fibreboard" or "company" or "employer".
6 According to the trial examiner's report the unit consisted of 73, approximately 50 of
whom were represented by the steelworkers.
The trial examiner found that a bona fide collective bargaining relationship had been
established some time in 1937 and has existed continually since that time.
8 These dilatory tactics were amplified by the court in the following passage:
On June 2, the Company acknowledged receipt of the Union's notice and stated:
"We will contact you at a later date regarding a meeting for this purpose." As
required by the contract, the Union sent a list of proposed modifications on June
15. Efforts by the Union to schedule a bargaining session met with no success until
July 27, four days before the expiration of the contract, when the Company notified
the Union of its desire to meet. 379 U.S. 203 at 205-206.
In the trial examiner's Intermediate Report is found more detail and chrono-
logical statement of these dilatory tactics. On the 26th of June the business rep-
resentative for Local 1304 requested a meeting. He was requested by a company
representative to postpone such a meeting until the week of July 12. During that
week the union's representative was not even able to contact, much less meet with
the company's representative. The negotiations remained at this stage until the
morning of July 27 when the union was informed that it was the company's in-
tention to eliminate the entire unit by a subcontracting arrangement. It was only
after the union was informed of this decision that the company requested a meet-
ing with the union for the afternoon of July 27. 130 NLRB 1558 at 1567-68.
o The letter delivered to the union during the July 27 meeting highlights the unilateral
manner in which the company's decision was reached. The letter read in pertinent part:
For some time we have been seriously considering the question of letting out our
Emeryville maintenance work .... and have now reached a definite decision to do
so effective August 1, 1959. In these circumstances we are sure you will realize that
negotiation of a new contract would be pointless. 130 NLRB 1558 at 1568.
The unilateral decision, it should be noted, was not without rhyme, reason, or merit. As
cited in the Intermediate Report of Trial Examiner Howard Myers, exhaustive studies and
Comments
ing between the Steelworkers and Fibreboard, held on July 30, was of no
avail; the company merely reiterated its position as announced at the July
27 meeting.
A natural consequence of the termination of the contract on July 31 was
the establishment of a picket line on the evening of July 31, 1959. In addi-
tion to this picketing activity, the union filed unfair labor practice charges
with the N. L. R. B. in which it was alleged that Fibreboard had violated
Sections 8 (a) (1), (3) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act.10 The
General Counsel's office, pursuant to the authority given in Section 10 (b) of
the Act,'1 issued a complaint alleging those violations raised by the union's
initial charge.
B. Original Board Decision
The trial examiner, after taking testimony in a two day hearing, recommend-
ed in his Intermediate Report that the charges be dismissed. 12 The rationale
used by the trial examiner 1 3 and initially adopted by the Board was that the
decision to subcontract its maintenance work in the Emeryville plant was
motivated by purely economic reasons, showed no union animus and was,
therefore, not in violation of the Act.14
In this decision, Member Fanning filed a dissent in which he argued that
the Supreme Court's ruling in Railway Telegraphers5 and the Board's deci-
sion in Timken Roller Bearing 6 compelled a different result than that
reached by the majority. Fanning's dissent forecasted both the Board's result
and reasoning on reconsideration and ultimately the Supreme Court's deci-
sion. His rationale can best be capsuled as follows:
As a result of the majority's decision, employers by the simple expedient of uni-
analysis of the maintenance operators at Fibreboard's Emeryville plant had begun some five
years earlier and were updated immediately prior to the termination of the Steelworker
contract. These cost studies together with discussions with prospective subcontractors
allowed the trial examiner to make a finding of fact that the potential savings "might run
as high as $225,000 per year". 130 NLRB 1565 at 1572.
10 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1) (3) and (5) (1956).
149 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (b) (1956).
130 NLRB 1558 at 1565 (1961).13Id. at 1565-74.
14 Id. at 1559.
15 Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago and N.W.R. Co., 362 U.S. 330 (1960). Even
though the Telegraphers case was governed by the Railway Labor Act it should be noted
that in the Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F. 2d 247 (7th. Cir. 1948), it was held that the
duty to bargain under the National Labor Relations Act is broader in scope than the Rail-
way Labor Act. "A comparison of the language of the two acts shows that Congress in the
instant legislation must have intended a bargaining provision of broader scope than con-
templated in the Railway Labor Act." Id. at 254-55.
16 Timken Roller Bearing Company, 70 NLRB 500, enforcement denied on other grounds
161 F. 2d. 949 (6th. Cir. 1947).
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laterally subcontracting work may abolish every job in a collective bargaining
unit and thereby eliminate union representation.17
C.. Town and Country Decision
In April of 1962, some thirteen months after its original decision, the Board,
its composition altered by appointments of President Kennedy, 18 set the stage
for a dramatic reversal in determining what was a mandatory subject of col-
lective bargaining. In the Town and Country Manufacturing Company
case, 19 the new majority found, with Member Rodgers dissenting, that uni-
lateral subcontracting motivated by union animus violated Section 8 (a) (5)
of the Act.
2 0
By way of dictum, the Board established the rigid rule that a decision to
subcontract motivated by purely economic reasons is a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining.
Accordingly, even if Respondent's subcontract was impelled by economic or
I.C.C. considerations, we would nevertheless find that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a) (5) by failing to fulfill its mandatory obligation to consult with the
union regarding its decision to subcontract.21
In accordance with this dictum, the Board expressly overruled Fibreboarda2
the motion for reconsideration of which was still undecided.28
D. Supplemental Fibreboard Decision
The Board, sitting in a three-man panel, followed both the letter and spirit
of the Fanning dissent in the original Fibreboard decision.24
17 180 NLRB 1558 at 1564.
There were two Kennedy appointments made in 1961 which according to some authors
changed the entire field of labor law. See generally McGuINN, NEw FRONTIER NLRB (1963).
Chairman McCulloch was appointed on March 7, 1961 but took no part in the first Fibre-
board decision issued on March 22, 1961. Member Brown commenced his term August 27,
1961. Member Fanning who wrote the dissent in the original Fibreboard opinion was
appointed by President Eisenhower and reappointed by President Kennedy in 1962.
136 NLRB 1022 (1962).
"Id. at 1027.
2 Id. at 1027-28.
"Upon reconsideration of the Fibreboard opinion, we are now (of) the view that it un-
duly extends the area within which an employer may curtail or eliminate entirely job
opportunities for its employees without notice to them or negotiation with their bargaining
representative." 136 NLRB 1022 at 1027.
2 Although the various petitions for reconsideration were filed by the Steelworkers coun-
sel on May 15, 1961, and by the General Counsel's Office on June 7, 1961, the Board's Supple-
mental Decision and Order was delayed pending the outcome of Town &' Country, supra.
The second or supplemental decision in Fibreboard was issued on September 13, 1962, some
five months after Town &' Country came down, and 34 months after the issuance of the Trial
Examiner's Intermediate Report.
24 Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation, 138 NLRB 550 (1962). The panel was com-
posed of Chairman McCulloch and members Fanning and Rodgers, with the latter writing
in dissent.
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Accordingly, for the reasons and considerations expressed in Town and Country
and in the dissenting opinion in the original Fibreboard case, we find that Re-
spondent's failure to negotiate with the charging union concerning its mainte-
nance work constituted a violation of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.25
In using what was ultimately to become the reasoning of the Supreme
Court, the Board embraced two earlier decisions of the highest court in estab-
lishing the mandatory nature of bargaining over subcontracting. 26 In Railway
Telegraphers, the employer sought to eliminate a number of small stations
manned by agents who were, at the time, performing less than one hour's work
per an eight hour day. The Telegraphers' union sought to reopen the con-
tract, proposed a clause prohibiting the abolition of any existing job and
threatened to strike in the event that the employer refused to bargain about
this issue. The employer sought to enjoin the union from calling such a
strike, claiming that the request was related to "rates of pay, rules and work-
ing conditions." A fortiori, so their argument went, a strike called over the
refusal to bargain about the elimination of these jobs would not be a "labor
dispute" covered by the Norris-LaGuardia Act and, therefore, would be en-
joinable.27 For purposes of this comment, it is sufficient to say that the Su-
preme Court, in Telegraphers, held that such a dispute was well within the
intended purview of the Railway Labor Act. 28 As in Fibreboard, the broad
issue in the Telegraphers' case was whether the elimination of jobs is a "con-
dition of employment" within the meaning of our Federal labor laws.
In relying on Teamsters v. Oliver, the Board reminded the parties that the
Supreme Court has stamped approval on its original position on subcontract-
ing as set out in Timken Roller Bearing, i.e. subcontracting is a mandatory
subject of bargaining.29 The situation which confronted the Court in Oliver
was whether state anti-trust laws could be applied to a provision of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement setting out a "minimum rental to be paid by the
employer motor carriers who leased vehicles to be driven by their owners
rather than the carriers' employees ... " The Court found that the agreement
was upon a subject matter as to which the National Labor Relations Act di-
rected the parties to bargain and, hence, anti-trust statutes could not be ap-
plied to prevent the effectuation of the agreement. The Court observed that
the subject of minimum truck rentals for independent contractors was an
issue which could potentially create "curtailment of jobs through withdrawal
of more and more carrier-owned vehicles from service" s 0 and was, therefore,
a "condition of employment."
1Id. at 551.
" Telegraphers, supra note 15, and Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
0 Telegraphers, supra note 15 at 332-334.
1844 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152. First (1954).
2 Fibreboard, supra note 24, at 554.
30 Teamsters v. Oliver, supra note 26, at 294.
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E. Court of Appeals' Decision
In affirming the Board's decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia chose as its vehicle the broad policy considerations of industrial
"self-government" and a concept "that collective bargaining must be flexible
without precise delineation".' The following excerpt exhibits the concep-
tual approach of the Court of Appeals to the duty to bargain:
In framing Section 8(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §158(d), Congress was incorporating
the decisions of the Board and the Courts defining the duty to bargain collec-
tively. The statutory definition of those subjects about which the parties were
required to bargain was of necessity framed in the broadest terms possible: wages,
hours, terms and conditions of employment. The use of this language was a re-
flection of the congressional awareness that the act covered a wide variety of
industrial and commercial activity and a recognition that collective bargaining
must be kept flexible without precise delineation of what subjects were covered
so that the Act could be administered to meet changing conditions. 2
F. The Supreme Court Opinion
1) Petitioner's Argument
After the D. C. Circuit handed down its decision, counsel for Fibreboard pe-
titioned for redress from the Supreme Court.83 In arguing that both the Board
and Circuit Court were in error, the petitioner exhorted the Court to find
that it was only the effect of the decision to subcontract and not the decision
itself which must be dealt with in the collective bargaining process. 34 Ac-
knowledging that such a decision does have an "impact" on members of the
bargaining unit, Fibreboard insisted that such would be the case no matter
what managerial decision was made concerning the maintenance and/or
production operations of the company. To require bargaining over decisions
of "impact", so went the argument, would give little stabilization to manage-
ment directives and completely usurp the area of management prerogative.8 5
The true requirement of section 8 (d) of the Act, according to the company,
was not that all matters of "impact" be discussed at negotiations but only
those having an impact "on wages, hours and conditions of employment."
Thus, a decision to subcontract, in and of itself, had no impact on
"East Bay Union of Machinists v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (1963).
"Id. at 414.
"The Court of Appeals handed down its decision on July 3, 1963. Both a petition for
rehearing before the Division and En Banc were denied on September 27, 1963. Counsel for
Fibreboard petitioned for certiorari on November 8, 1963, and the Court granted it on Janu-
ary 6, 1964.
,See Brief for Petitioner in Fibreboard in the U. S. Supreme Court, p. 14.
Id. at 16-18.
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these "wages, hours and working conditions" and was, therefore, not cov-
ered by 8 (d) nor was there a violation of 8 (a) (5) to refuse to negotiate con-
cerning a decision to subcontract out. However, in making the distinction
between the decision and its effect, counsel for Fibreboard readily admitted
the company's statutory duty regarding the latter.36
The petitioner further argued that this "impact" theory of the Board, if
unchecked, would logically require the company to bargain over every deci-
sion imaginable.3 7 In addition, even if this onus was accepted by the com-
pany, there would always be the possibility that the decision made after the
bargaining would be reversed years later for failure of the negotiations to
conform to "the erratic notions" that the Board and courts have set up.38
2) The Board's Argument
The Board, arguing for enforcement of its Decision and Order and affirm-
ance of the Court of Appeals, urged the court to give the words "terms and
conditions of employment" the broadest possible reading so that "any stipu-
lation which either party considers" vital to its interests may become such a
term or condition.39 This reading, according to the Board, would carry out
the basic policy of the Act "by bringing a troublesome problem within the
framework Congress established as most conductive to just and peaceable in-
dustrial relations. '40
The Board further argued that the established practice in collective bar-
gaining clearly illustrates that "stipulations" dealing with subcontracting
are within the purview of "terms and conditions of employment." In show-
ing this "established practice", the Board explained the diverse methods
which are employed so that the bargaining representative will have some
voice and perhaps control over "letting out" of work which is, should or will
be performed by the members of the unit.41
Answering the general claim that, to require bargaining over whether to
subcontract out the work of an existing unit, would undercut industrial effi-
MId. at 14, 22.
id. at 21.
38d. at p. 11. In the Circuit Court opinion, the Court stated that the company had a
statutory duty to have "prior discussions" on the decision to subcontract so as to bargain
to an "impasse." 322 F.2d at 413. For the possibility of the managerial decision being "re-
versed some years later", see Footnote 23 above. In addition to the thirty-four month delay
between the Trial Examiner's report and the Board's supplemental decision and order, we
have four months from the time of the decision of the company to let this work out to the
Trial Examiner's report (38 months to Board decision) and another twenty-six months after
the Board's decision until the Supreme Court's opinion came down. In short, sixty-four
months between the decision to subcontract out the work at Emeryville and the ultimate
reversal by the Supreme Court.
1 Brief for Respondent in Fibreboard in the United States Supreme Court, p. 23.
' ld. at 8.
11 Id. at 29-36 and materials cited therein.
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ciency, the Board proffered that the only statutory requirement imposed is
that, in certain circumstances, the employer and the bargaining representa-
tive negotiate about any proposals offered by either party on the subject.
The requirement and the extent of such negotiations, it was argued, will, of
course, depend upon the terms of the existing or just expired agreement, the
effect on the unit, the business necessities involved, the nature of the subcon-
tracting, etc. 42 In admitting the possible infringement on what has been held
by some as an "absolute prerogative" to run an efficient operation, the Board
called the Court's attention to its own language in Wiley v. Livingston:
.. the objectives of national policy, reflected in established principles of federal
law, require the rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their
business and even eliminate themselves as employers be balanced by some pro-
tection to employees from a sudden change in the employment relationship.4 3
The Board also relied on the earlier Supreme Court cases of Railway Teleg-
raphers and Oliver, along with a number of Circuit Court opinions to but-
tress its contention that "contracting out" was a mandatory subject of collec-
tive bargaining.44
In essence, the Board's position in relying on Telegraphers is that the Su-
preme Court found in Telegraphers the existence of a labor dispute within
the framework of Norris-LaGuardia; that this labor dispute was brought
about by union attempts, in compliance with the statutory commands of the
Railway Labor Act, to bargain over a change in "rates of pay, rules and work-
ing conditions", i.e. closing of way stations on the railroad line; that the labor
dispute, as defined in Norris-LaGuardia and found in Telegraphers, is the
same as that in Section 2 (9) of the National Labor Relations Act; that the
words "terms and conditions" found in the definition of a labor dispute in
Section 2 (9) of the National Labor Relations Act have the same meaning in
Section 8 (d) which requires parties to bargain collectively over "terms and
conditions" and Section 9 (a) of the Act which allows for the exclusive repre-
sentative to bargain for those "terms and conditions"; that terms and condi-
tions, including "rates of pay, rules and working conditions" of the Railway
Labor Act are "no broader" than terms and conditions embraced in the perti-
nent sections of the National Labor Relations Act; that the lack of a realistic
distinction between the statutes makes the alleged distinction between shut-
ting down part of a company's operation and the subcontracting out of work
formerly done by employees just as impossible and unrealistic. 45
ld. at 9.
1Ibid., quoting Wiley v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549.
"
4 Brief for Board, note 39, supra, at pp. 51-57.
Oid. at 55-57.
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The Board, in seeking support in the Oliver decision, reminded the Court
that, in Oliver, it was faced with the issue of whether the National Labor Re-
lations Act preempted the labor relations field against applying a state anti-
trust statute to a minimum truck rental clause in a collective bargaining
agreement. In that case, the Court held that the contract provision in ques-
tion was the result of the parties' mandatory obligation to bargain over terms
and conditions. The Board urged that, in the Oliver case, the agreement
treated a form of subcontracting and that the only factual difference between
Fibreboard and Oliver was that the latter dealt in "piecemeal" subcontract-
ing while the former dealt with contracting out of unit employees' work in
one fell swoop. 48
3) The Court's Decision
a) Majority Opinion. The Court announced at the outset of its opinion that
the "contracting out" of work formerly done by an existing unit had the in-
evitable result of the "termination of employment" of those unit employees
and therefore "well within the literal meaning of the phrase 'terms and con-
ditions of employment'." 47
To fortify this literal reading of the statute, the Court linked such an inter-
pretation with broad policy considerations of the Act. Chief Justice Warren,
speaking for the majority, reasoned that "contracting out," if included as a
mandatory subject of bargaining, would "effectuate the purposes of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act."48 In taking up this cause, which appears to ex-
emplify the implicit breadth of the decision, 49 the Court affirmed the Board's
decision, with the admonition that such a result,
would promote the fundamental purpose of the Act by bringing a problem of
vital concern to labor and management within the framework established by
Congress as most conducive to industrial peace. 50
To further buttress its conclusion, the Court examined the "industrial bar-
gaining practices" prevalent throughout the country. The majority reasoned
that such an approach would be beneficial in determining "the propriety of
including a particular subject within the scope of mandatory bargaining."51
In its examination, the Court found substantial evidence that "contracting
out in one form or anothei" has been widely accepted as a subject of bar-
gaining.52
"I1d. at 57.
'7 Fibreboard v. NLRB, supra note 1, at 210.
Is Ibid.
"See text accompanying footnotes 84 and 85, infra.
uO Fibreboard v. NLRB, supra note 1, at 211.
'aIbid.
aIbid.
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As final support for its decision, the Court relied heavily upon the Board's
position concerning the applicability of Oliver to the instant case.53 In bor-
rowing from both the reasoning and language of the Board's brief, the Court
found the only distinction between the two cases was
that the work of the employees in the bargaining unit was let out piecemeal in
Oliver, whereas here the work of the entire unit has been contracted out.54
As a preliminary to the actual admonition that the decision was not meant
to, nor did it extend to other "forms of 'contracting out' .... which arise in
our complex economy," 55 the Court went to great lengths to show how these
facts, in this particular dispute, made the submission to mandatory "collec-
tive negotiation" the only feasible solution.5 6 To dissuade the doubts ex-
pressed in the concurring opinion, the majority noted that Fibreboard was
not precluded from managing its business as it sought; this unilateral deci-
sion to contract out the unit work included no plans for "capital in-
vestment;" and the work was still to be performed in the plant, and under
basically the same conditions.5 7 Thus, the replacement of unit employees by
those who were to perform basically the same work as the unit people was
the only matter which the Court was "explicitly" addressing itself to. This
"limitation" or "lack of extension" is discussed elsewhere in this comment.58
b) Concurring Opinion. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas and
Harlan, admittedly concerned with the "disturbing breadth" of the majority
opinion and unappeased by its recurring theme of limitation, filed an opin-
ion concurring in the result "within the narrow limitations implicit in the
specific facts of this case." 59
As his first point of departure Stewart questions the use of the "industrial
experience" as promulgated in the majority. Without doubting its validity
in principle he queries as to the propriety of the "industrial experience" test
employed by the majority. The fact that "contracting out" is mentioned in a
number of collective bargaining contracts or the subject of a number of
grievances indicates to Stewart no more than that the parties may have con-
sidered it mutually advantageous to bargain over these issues on a permissive
basis. 60
'See text accompanying footnotes 40 through 46, supra, for an enunciation of the
Board's argument as well as text accompanying footnotes 70 through 80, infra, which dis-
cusses both Oliver and Telegraphers as used by the Supreme Court in its decision.
5 1d. at 212.
5Id. at 215.
5
M Id. at 213-214.
mid. at 213.
m See text accompanying footnotes 84 through 97, infra.
0 Fibreboard v. NLRB, supra note 1, at 219.
60 Id. at 220 (Emphasis supplied).
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Stewart further warned that the "limiting purpose" of the NLRA as seen
in both the words of the Act 6' and its legislative history62 requires that courts
develop the most narrow of concepts in "delineating a limited category of
issues which are subject to the duty to bargain collectively."
Mr. Justice Stewart's admonition of a narrow interpretation was prompted
by what he termed "passages in the Court's opinion ... which suggest ... an
expansive interpretation" by implying "that any issue which may reasonably
divide an employer and his employees must be a subject of compulsory col-
lective bargaining." 63
After discussion of the possible, and perhaps the natural results from this
impliedly broad approach of the majority opinion, Justice Stewart, in con-
clusion, discussed the prime areas of future conflicts in the area of subcon-
tracting. "Automation and onrushing technological change", according to
the Justice, are problems of vital concern to the economy and might there-
fore require either government or organized labor or both to soften the "po-
tentially cruel impact [of automation and change] upon the lives and for-
tunes" of the workingman. This, however, is a problem that looks to Con-
gress for solution, not to an expanding judicial construction of the Taft-
Hartley Act.64
II. FORMS OF SUBCONTRACTING
To understand the complexity of the issues left unresolved by the Supreme
Court's decision, a survey of the various forms of subcontracting which arise
in the industrial world is essential.65 For purposes of this comment, it is help-
ful to delineate the broad categories of subcontracting rather than attempt
an exhaustive catalogue. We are concerned primarily with the distinction
between work which can be performed by the employees in the bargaining
unit, using currently available equipment and skills, and work which cannot
be performed by the existing work force for a variety of reasons. 66 For exam-
The concurring opinion argues that the statute specifies wages, hours and other condi-
tions of employment as those subjects upon which the parties are bound to confer.
62In the conference report accompanying the Taft-Hartley Act, Justice Stewart pointed
out that the spirit of the House version of Taft-Hartley was part of the final bill. The
House version was most specific and detailed as to what were mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Session, 2 (11) (B) (VI) (1947).
1 Fibreboard v. NLRB, supra, note 1, at 221.
T Id. at 225, 226.
6 For a more detailed discussion of the business practices embodied in the term "sub-
contracting" see Young, The Contracting Out of Work 4-10 (1964). See also Brief for Re-
spondent in Fibreboard in the U.S. Supreme Court, pp. 7-13, and Amicus Brief of the Elec-
tronic Industries Association, pp. 5-10.
Query whether the employer may unilaterally subcontract work which requires only a
minimal amount of training at a time when unit employees who ordinarily perform other
jobs have been laid off. A "substantial impact on the bargaining unit" test would infer a
bargaining requirement before closing avenues of continued employment to members of
the bargaining unit.
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ple, the employer may lack the necessary machinery or equipment; the em-
ployees may not possess the requisite skills; the number of employees in the
unit may be inadequate or the demands of production during peak periods
may compel the temporary assistance of an outside subcontractor. As to all
of these forms of subcontracting which recur daily in our economy, the
Court's opinion in Fibreboard does not concern itself since, by definition,
they do not have an immediate impact on the tenure of employment of mem-
bers of the bargaining unit.
The problem areas are centered on subcontracting practices which pose a
threat to the tenure of employment or other conditions of employment of
members of the bargaining unit. A condition precedent to the existence of
an employer's duty to bargain about a decision to subcontract is the possibil-
ity that the work involved can be performed by unit employees. Thus, a pri-
mary question in subcontracting cases is whether the employees have the req-
uisite skills to perform the work.67 A condition of full employment in the
bargaining unit would also resolve the employer's doubts as to whether he
is free to subcontract work which does not detract from the employment of
the unit members. And certainly, the Fibreboard opinion does not suggest
that the employer must invest in new machinery rather than subcontract out
a new phase of operation even if some members of the unit are unemployed.
Within the area of work which can possibly be performed by employees in
the bargaining unit, a considerable diversity of situations exist in which the
issue of subcontracting might arise. The employer may subcontract work on
a day-to-day basis. May the unit demand the employer bargain about such
daily decisions when employment in the bargaining unit declines? Is it sig-
nificant that unit employees have ever performed such work? If the unit ac-
quiesced in a subcontracting decision during a period of full employment,
is it precluded from seeking to recapture work previously performed by unit
employees?
On a long term subcontract, similar questions arise as well as the ques-
tion: May the unit request bargaining during the duration of a long term
subcontract despite the contractual obligations of the employer to the sub-
contractor?
Subcontracting may occur at different significant times in the unit-employ-
er relationship. The employer may decide to subcontract during the union
organizational drive, during the pendency of a petition for an N.L.R.B. elec-
tion, during, beginning or after an election,68 during a strike, 60 during the
For example, the common practice in the construction and defense-related industries
is not within the scope of the Fibreboard opinion. In those industries, a contract is executed
with a general contractor who employs subcontractors to perform the specialized work. See
Brief for Respondent in U.S. Supreme Court, 13-14.
See NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc. 293 F.2d. 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
0 See Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321, F.2d 397 (9 Cir. 1963).
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term of a collective bargaining agreement, during negotiations for a new
agreement as in Fibreboard, or after the expiration of a contract, during
negotiations for a new contract.
The illustrations set out above are graphic examples of the issues which
evolve from subcontracting in present day industrial society. To argue that
the Supreme Court decision in Fibreboard has answered these questions
with a flat "no subcontracting without bargaining" rule would be naive.
III. CASES RELIED ON BY SUPREME COURT
The basic facts and propositions of law emanating from both Oliver and the
Railway Telegraphers cases have been elaborated upon earlier.70 The use of
the Railway Telgraphers proposition that job elimination "is well within
the literal meaning of the phrase 'terms and conditions of employment' "71
indicates that, perhaps, the Supreme Court was, in fact, struggling to find a
much broader base for the definition of mandatory subjects of bargaining.
This is so regardless of the majority's cautioning remarks that there was no
attempt to expand "the scope of mandatory bargaining" and that the "de-
cision need not and does not encompass other forms of contracting out". 72
The Court obviously revived the spirit of the Telegraphers case with the
rationale that elimination of jobs by changed methods of operation is an area
of vital interest and, as such, is a mandatory subject of bargaining.73 This con-
cern with the elimination of jobs squarely places the Board in the arena
foreseen by Mr. Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion, i.e. "automation
and onrushing technological change." 74 It should be here noted that Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart, while recognizing that the elimination of jobs is a burning issue
in present industrial society, nevertheless maintains that the framework of
judicial innovation, absent an amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act, should
not settle such disputes.75 Furthermore, the citation of the Telegraphers opin-
ion would negate the limitation of the Fibreboard opinion to its particular
facts. Unlike the Telegraphers case, in Fibreboard "the company's decision
to contract out the maintenance work did not alter the company's basic op-
eration, ' r whereas, in Telegraphers, the basic issue was whether the company
70 See text accompanying footnotes 26 through 30 and 39 through 46.
7 tFibreboard v. NLRB, supra note 1, at 210.
2Id. at 215.
78Id. at 210.
71 Id. at 225.
75 See, however, the Court of Appeals decision of Fibreboard wherein the D.C. Circuit de-
cided that the phrase "conditions of employment" was by congressional design meant as a
broad formulation to resolve industrial conflicts in light of contemporary standards. 322
F.2d 411 at 414.
76Id. at 213.
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unilaterally could alter its "basic operation" by "abolishing" certain way
stations.77
This "broader base" theory as applied to Oliver, the major case relied on
by the Court in Fibreboard, flies in the face of the desire to limit the scope
and effect of the Fibreboard decision. In Oliver, the issue was, as stated by
the Court in Fibreboard, whether the employer must bargain over the possi-
ble "curtailment of jobs and the undermining of conditions of employ.
ment."78 At the same time as it argued for the limiting of its decision to the
abolition of an entire unit of employees by a subcontracting device, the
Court reaffirmed the principle of the Oliver case that the possible, gradual
curtailment of jobs is a mandatory subject. Taking the principle of Oliver
and applying it to a variation of the Fibreboard fact situation, we readily
see that piecemeal subcontracting, which falls short of the elimination of an
entire unit, would nevertheless be a mandatory subject of bargaining.
In essence, regardless of the limitation of Fibreboard to its own facts, the
rationale of the ultimate decision must be placed in a framework of preexist-
ing law, i.e. Railway Telegraphers and Oliver. As a corollary to this, it should
be noted that Fibreboard has brought the two above-named decisions out of
their respective narrow setting of Norris-LaGuardia and alleged anti-trust
violations79 and focused on the applicability of the cases in the broader area
of the interpretation of the term "conditions of employment."8 0
IV. ADAMS DAIRY CASE
Upon the supposition that the Fibreboard opinion had, for the time being,
given the needed guidance to the various Circuits, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the Adams Dairy case.81
In its opinion, the Eighth Circuit had not been receptive to the Board's
argument that a decision to subcontract out an entire unit's work was a man-
datory subject of bargaining.8 2
The Supreme Court's remand of the Adams Dairy case buttresses the ear-
lier mentioned tenet that the Supreme Court was establishing a broad prin-
ciple in the Fibreboard case. By ordering reconsideration in light of the
Fibreboard case, the Court has asked the Eighth Circuit to hold that a deci-
7 Telegraphers, supra note 15, at 332.
78 Fibreboard v. NLRB, supra note 1, at 212.
" See Brief for Petitioner in Fibreboard in the U.S. Supreme Court, 23-26. See also Farmer,
Good Faith Bargaining Over Subcontracting 51 GEo. L. J. 558 (1963). Farmer, Bargaining
Requirements in Connection with Subcontracting, Plant Removal, Sale of Business, Merger
and Consolidation, 14 LABOR LAW JOURNAL 951 (Dec. 1963).
10 See Brief for Respondent, note 42 supra, at 54-57. See also Freilicher, Collective Bargain-
ing and Contracting Out, 13 FED. B. J. 332 at 342 (1963).
81 NLRB v. Adams Dairy, 379 U.S. 644 (1965).
0 NLRB v. Adams Dairy, 322 F.2d 553 (8 Cir. 1963).
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sion to contract out while an agreement is in effect, which decision current-
ly eliminates the unit covered by the existing agreement, is a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining. In the Adams case, the union's contract had two and a
half years to run before expiration. In Fibreboard, when the final decision
was reached to subcontract out, the collective bargaining agreement between
the company and the Steelworkers was about to expire. This, in and of it-
self, is broadening the original holding.8 3
V. PROJECTING THE "BROAD BASE"
Well aware that the majority opinion was grounded on a "broad base", po-
tentially applicable to areas of employment security quite distinct from the
factual setting in Fibreboard, justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion,
strove to foreclose any such extension of the decision. Thus, he states:
An enterprise may decide to invest in labor-saving machinery. Another may
resolve to liquidate its assets and go out of business. Nothing the Court holds
today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding
such managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entreprenurial control.8 4
Justice Stewart's concern highlights the significance of the reasoning behind
the majority's opinion. The majority's concern with the elimination of unit
jobs potentially extends far beyond the borders of Fibreboard's facts into
management decisions to introduce labor-saving technological innovations
and to relocate or withdraw from business entirely. In fact, the NLRB has
already carried their approach that far.8 5
In concerning itself with the impact of subcontracting on employment
security of bargaining unit employees and with the policy of promoting in-
dustrial peace through collective negotiation in troublesome areas of labor-
management relations, the Court grants recognition to the employees' inter-
ests in decisions which affect tenure of employment and the public's interest
in the accommodation of the conflicting interests of labor and management
by collective bargaining, rather than open economic warfare.
1, For an interesting discussion of the substantial daference between the mandatory nature
of bargaining over subcontracting during the life of the agreement and the transitional
period see Farmer note 53, supra. Perhaps it will be this distinction that the 8th circuit will
use as the vehicle to maintain its earlier position. Although neither the Supreme Court on
its granting the petition for certiorari nor the 8th. Cir. in its original decision give any
weight to this distinction, the latter might find itself impressed with the majority's admo-
nition that the Fibreboard decision was necessarily limited.
14 Fibreboard, supra, note 1 at 223.
s5See e.g., Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 NLRB 241 (1962), enforcement denied, 325 F.2d. 682
(4th. Cir. 1963), remanded for reconsideration March 29, 1965 (redistribution of work
within corporate entity); Renton News Record, 136 NLRB 1294 (1962) (introduction of
labor-saving machinery); and Star Baby Co., 140 NLRB 678 (1963) enforced as modified,
334 F.2d 601 (2d. Cir. 1964) (decision to go out of business).
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Thus, while the Supreme Court has not ruled that every employer deci-
sion directly affecting job security is a mandatory subject of bargaining, it has
clearly established that the employee has a legitimate interest in decisions as
to whether or not his job will continue to exist. Granting this employee in-
terest in job security, courts faced with problems arising from automation
or plant relocation decisions must, at the least, balance the conificting inter-
ests of employees and entrepreneurs. The Court, in Fibreboard, demands an
accommodation of competing claims and has dictated the preferred method
of settling differences-the bargaining table. No longer can the Courts rely
on a strict "management rights" theory in cases involving employment ter-
mination issues. An analysis and balancing of admittedly divergent interests
is the least that the Fibreboard opinion commands.
VI. THE EVOLVING BOARD DOCTRINE
A. Case-by-Case Approach
The complexity of situations in which Fibreboard and Town and Country
might be applied is limited only by the imagination of labor and manage-
ment personnel and the variety of business activity. Faced with a host of
cases86 in which distinctions from Fibreboard have been argued, the NLRB
has retreated from its seemingly rigid prior position that the decision to sub-
contract unit work, involving a total or partial elimination of the bargaining
unit, is a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Thus, in Hartman Luggage,8 7 we find the Board agreeing with the trial
examiner that a showing of unilateral employer action in signing a subcon-
tracting agreement to lease his entire operation without consulting the union
only establishes a prima facie case of refusal to bargain. Such evidence might
be overcome, the Board reasoned, by good faith bargaining subsequent to the
decision and also by the employer's conduct prior to the decision. In short,
the Board in Hartman evidenced an intention to adopt a case-by-case analy-
sis of particular subcontracting practices, discarding its prior per se viola-
tion theory.
In Shell Oil Co.,88 the Board propounded a statement of its new approach
to Fibreboard-type cases:
"According to the quarterly report issued by the office of the General Counsel of the
NLRB, for the period ending June 30, 1964, the Regional Advice Branch had considered in
that quarter 175 cases in which there was a subcontracting issue. In almost half of these
cases, the charges were dismissed, in the great majority of those remaining complaints did
issue.
17145 NLRB 1572 at 1572-73 (1964). This approach followed in Georgia-Pacific Corpora-
tion, 150 NLRB No. 88 (1965).
8149 NLRB No. 26 (1964).
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The principles of these earlier cases, however, are not meant to be hard and fast
rules to be mechanically applied irrespective of the circumstances of the case.
In applying these principles we are mindful that the permissibility of unilateral
subcontracting will be determined by a consideration of the setting of each
case. Thus, the amount of time and discussion required to satisfy the statutory
obligation 'to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith' may vary with
the character of the subcontracting, the impact on employees, and the exigencies
of the particular business situation involved. In short, the principles in this are
not, nor are they intended to be, inflexibly rigid in application.8 9
B. The "Substantial Impact" Test
A primary consideration in the evolving Board doctrine has been the impact
of the subcontracting decisions on the employment of members of the bar-
gaining unit. While not limiting Fibreboard to its own facts, i.e. the elimina-
tion of the unit represented by the union, the Board has been reluctant to
require bargaining where there has been no "substantial impact" on the
work available to the unit employees. In General Motors Corp.,90 the Board
found that the employer's decision to lease the operati-n of a parking lot
previously manned by UAW employees did not "result in any substantial
impairment of the bargaining unit."91 In that case, the former parking lot
employees were reassigned to assembly line work at "comparable" wage rates.
In Westinghouse Electric Corporation,2 the Board was faced with a situa-
tion in which contracting out of work was extensive and firmly established
as a company practice. More than seven thousand subcontracts were in issue,
the majority of which involved work within the capabilities of the existing
labor force. Bargaining about these daily decisions to subcontract, the Board
ruled, was not required by Section 8 (a) (5). The following limitations were
held to be implicit in prior landmark cases:
In the Fibreboard line of cases, where the Board has found unilateral contracting
out of unit work to be violative of Section 8(a) (5) and (1), it has invariably ap-
peared that the contracting out involved a departure from previously established
operating practices, effected a change in conditions of employment, or resulted
in a significant impact on job tenure employment security, or reasonably antici-
pated work opportunities for those in the bargaining unit.93
19 Ibid. In this case the employer notified the union of a proposed transfer of trucking
account to a new location a few days before the effective date of the change. The employer
met with the union and assured the negotiators that no employees in the unit would be
laid off or discharged. The Board emphasized that the decision to transfer, although already
reached, could have been reversed.
0 149 NLRB No. 40 (1964).
Ibid.
150 NLR.B No. 136.
9Ibid.
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Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Board found no vio-
lation because the employer was motivated solely by economic considera-
tions, traditional business methods of the employer had been used, the
amount or kind of subcontracting was consistent with the employer's past
practice, there was no signficant impact on unit employees, and the union
could bargain about subcontracting practices at general negotiating meetings.
Recent cases support the conclusion that the primary test currently em-
ployed by the Board is whether the effect of the subcontracting will be of
detriment to the members of the bargaining unit.94 In all of these cases, it was
conceded that the work was within the capabilities of bargaining unit em-
ployees; yet the Board found no violation.
C. Inadequacies Of The Test
This "substantial impact" theory of the Board suffers from a basic defect. It
assumes that the employer will be able to foresee the impact of his decision
at the time it is made. But the decision is made at a particular point in time
and the substantial impact theory freezes that moment for application of the
test. Variables such as seasonal or cyclical fluctuations in demand, the compo-
sition of the work force and its skills and the in-plant equipment are viewed
as constants. While a particular decision to subcontract may not affect the
bargaining unit at the moment of decision, subsequent events may show that
the bargaining unit was critically affected by such a decision or series of de-
cisions.
At the time of his decision to subcontract, the employer cannot be certain
as to the impact of his decision on the future distribution of work among
unit employees. He can speak with a high degree of certitude about the pres-
ent but his projection into the future is no more than an educated guess,
subject to the constantly changing conditions in the plant, the industry and
the economy as a whole. Yet, he must make a policy decision before he signs
a subcontracting agreement. He must then decide whether or not to notify
and bargain with the union about his proposed action, keeping in mind that
a future impact on the bargaining unit may demonstrate that he violated
Section 8 (a) (5).
In cases arising to date under the Board's "substantial impact" doctrine,
no indication has been given that potential impact on conditions of employ-
ment in the bargaining unit is significant. More appropriately, the Board's
primary test should be termed "present substantial impact." Rather than
adopting a long range test designed to protect the employees from unilateral
"American Oil Company, 151 NLRB No. 45 (1965); Fafnir Bearing Company, 151 NLRB
No. 40 (1965); Kennecott Copper Corporation, 148 NLRB No. 169 (1964).
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action affecting the conditions of employment, the Board has taken a narrow
exclusionary approach to the interpretation of "conditions of employment."
Under such a test, the employee is conclusively held to have no interest in
the subcontracting decision if it does not presently subject him to a detri-
ment, such as layoff, discharge or reduction of hours.
Yet the employee will be vitally affected by a decision to subcontract out
work not being done by unit employees during periods of peak production
but which has been done by unit employees in the past during slack periods.
He will, likewise, be affected by any permanent or long term decision to sub-
contract work which is within his competence. As the amount of work per-
formed in the plant decreases, the employee's potential value to the employer
diminishes until the employee finds that, if his job is eliminated, there are
no alternative jobs within the plant available for him. Subcontracting will
have so tightened the job structure at the plant that unit employees have lost
any diversity of opportunity. Surely the employees have a vital interest in
this process. It affects their tenure of employment and their possibility of
advancement.
It is not unreasonable to expect the Board to require bargaining about
subcontracting decisions which have a potential future impact on the em-
ployees in the unit. It follows from the bargaining requirement over deci-
sions to subcontract which have a substantial impact on the bargaining unit.
Whether this impact manifests itself directly or immediately is immaterial.
The issue is whether it affects "conditions of employment" for which the
employees, through their certified representative, have a right to bargain.
D. Management Rights Analysis
Much of the controversy over the duty to bargain about subcontracting has
been phrased in terms of "management prerogatives" and "employee inter-
ests" in "conditions of employment." Thus, the debate over the bargaining
duty of the employer was emotionally charged by outcries against the en-
croachment on principles of free enterprise. Assurances by the Board that
bargaining did not require capitulation to union demands 95 did not soften
the antagonism of management representatives to the Board's broad ap-
proach to the problem.96
Recently the Board has adopted, at least as one factor in its decisional
arsenal, this "management rights" approach. Where a contract is in effect
at the time of the subcontracting decision, a "management rights" clause in
that contract has recently been held applicable to decisions to subcontract.
9 7
0 Town & Country, supra, note 19, at 1027.
91 See note 2, supra.
"General Motors Corp., 149 NLRB No. 40; Shell Oil Co., 149 NLR.B No. 22.
1965]
Catholic University Law Review
In General Motors, the clause in the employer's agreement with the union
gave the employer responsibility for decisions concerning the method and
means of its operation, without any specific reference to subcontracting. Here
we find the Board reviving a "sleeper" clause, not intended to be applied in
derrogation of the union's newly discovered "right" to bargain about deci-
sions to subcontract. In Shell Chemical, the management rights clause was
forged in the heat of bargaining about subcontracting policies of the employ-
er and was more appropriately relied upon by the Board. Significantly, the
clause in Shell became part of the contract after the Board's decision in
Town and Country and Fibreboard.
In summary, management prerogative clauses are meaningful in resolving
subcontracting issues only where the parties contemplated their application
to subcontracting issues and specifically included subcontracting among the
rights granted to management.
CONCLUSIONS
We have seen that the Supreme Court in its reasoning supporting Fibreboard
employed a "broad base" approach while limiting the decision to the facts
in that particular case. Read in the light of prior cases relied on by the Court,
the Fibreboard decision at least stands for the proposition that a mange-
ment decision which will eliminate an entire bargaining unit, although
based on economic necessity, is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
Based on the Court's reliance on the Oliver case, it also appears that deci-
sions to subcontract which have a substantial impact on the bargaining unit
will be covered by the rule of Fibreboard. Whether the Court will agree with
the NLRB's limited definition of "impact" on the bargaining unit cannot be
discovered from a reading of Fibreboard and must await further clarification.
Use of the Railway Telegraphers case as a precedent forecasts the reading
of Section 8 (a) (5) to include management decisions to introduce automa-
tion into a plant, although it is clear that Justices Stewart, Harlan and Doug-
las would react violently to such a proposal.
Logical extension of the "broad base" theory would also necessarily in-
clude decisions to shut down the entire operation of a plant and to go out of
business entirely.
In these many and unsettled areas of labor relations law, the Supreme
Court in Fibreboard has given the labor lawyer abundant material for argu-
ment and extension of its decision, while refusing to indicate the direction
of its own future decisions.
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